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••• HARAMBEE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: IDS/WP 302 
TOWARDS A POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
RE-INTERPRETATION • 
A: Introduction .-...,.-
The study: of Harambee movement - Kenya's v.-rrsion of self help - has 
received relatively" little attention compared, with other phenomena like 
. time 
villagisation in Tanzania.' This is surprising and at the same/somewhat expected. 
Firsts, unlike villagisation in Tanzania^ Hara'mbee appears to be an unsystematic 
and almost .ad hoc response to the problems of rural poverty in Kenya. It was 
not ushered in as part of a systematic ideology for rural development. 
Rather, it has developed in its own momentum, first from a political slogan 
in 1963, then to sift.11 and medium sized projects such as cattle dips, access 
roads,; schools and health centres by the late sixties, and finally to the 
present ambitious Institutes of Science and Technology. The momentum has 
* 
continued despite a realisation by the Government in the later sixties that 
the movement was. getting out of control and, therefore, needed to be 
incorporated into central planning. The rapid pace with which Harambee has 
expanded, and the fact that it started at a time when most .indications were 
that the Government would-be- committed to planning means that scholars might 
have found it something of an aberration without a handle. 
Another reason why Harambee has not attracted so much attention 
might be that until recently the Government may have found the movement 
embarrassing due to its political overtones. Certainly the Government has 
not in the past encouraged critical analyses of Harambee activities.'0 Recently, 
hoi /ever, (March .1977) the Government has indicated that there is a need to 
study Harambeo activities at least from the planning point of view. 
Consequently,, the Ministry of Finance and Planning is contemplating some 
studies, with the view, one assumes, to assessing the planning, and development 
implications of Harambee. ('Standard.' March 11, 1977) The current official 
enthusiasm is characterised by newly found confidence which is reflected in 
such statements as "J'arambee is a good model for development in the. Third 
World" (Ibid.) . . . . 
The building blocks of the. model, are, howev;r, yet to be fully 
understand. It is, therefore, perhans .premature to talk of a "model" for 
the "Third, World" when it is not yet clear-what type of a'model-'is beihg 
discursed abd whether it is even uniformly • applicable to Kenya as''3'Whole, 
let alone the entire "Thiprd "orId".. .One. suspects that the enthusiasm is a 
result of the hope that Harambee has now suffic'eintly evolved to a stage 
•here it is no ? possible tp separate, its political, social,' administrative, 
and economic components. ' "• 
- .3 - IDS/WP 302 
The major problem, however, is not separating Hararribee into its 
consituent components though the problematic aspects in this- connection should 
not be underestimated. In our view, the primary problem is one of 
conceptualising Harambee.-in such a way that its many facets can be viewed 
as sub-concepts of one rural development concept. Only, afterwards can we 
then assess the limits and potentials of its applicability on a wider 
scale. The choice whether to start with analysis before attempting any 
synthesis is precisely that viz. an individual choice. So far, most of 
the students of Harambee seem to have approached the phenomenon analytically 
without much attempt to synthesise their empirical findings. But before we 
look into this problem, a few.words on the .general character of self-help in 
Kenya. 
The self-help movement in Kenya has been characterised by 
increasing expansion and expectations. Though the call for Harambee was 
made in 196 3, the movement did not realy pick up momentum until three 
years; later when what was at the beginning a political slogan for unity, 
started being translated into development projects. 
This, of course, does not mean that the idea was allowed to lie 
dormant- for a period of three years. In those three years, more than 
9,600 kilometres of access roads and over 1,000 small bridges were 
constructed by self-help. During the same period, more than 145 kilometres 
of pipeline, , 50 damr. and rock catchments, and 500 protected springs were 
installed through the same method. In addition, over 2,500 community 
facilities such as schools buildings, nursery cenrres, health centres and 
dispensaries, were built. '(Kenya Government: Second Development Plan, p.'523) 
The momentum gathered in first three years began to be reflected 
in 1967. In that year alone, over 3,600 community facilities were 
completed, 119 piped water supplies were installed, and '+10 wells and 
protected springs we're built. In addition, 1,659 fish ponds were built 
and stocked. The same year saw the first attempt by the Government to 
break down the nature of the inputs that went into Harambee projects, an 
exercise that has continued over since. In that year-, the peoples contri-
bution to self-help projects in terms of labour, cash and material amounted 
to approximately K£ ,2 million, quite'a substantial sum. The Government's 
contribution was, however, quite small. It constituted only 4% of the total 
value of projects;completed in 1967. But, despite the small, almost 
negligible, Government contribution, the'latter took Harambee seriously 
enough so put aside KfM-44,000 for part-finacning of self-help schemes 
during the period of the Second Development Plan, lr'70-1974. (Ibid) 
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A year by year presentation of > data on.: self-help inputs and 
outputs perhaps.not necessary at this stage. Suffice to say that after 
.1967, the -self-hf IP.--iroyeifient; continued to expand to the extent that the 
Government was obliged to take a serious view of the phenomenon as a 
planning problem. This was done in the second Development Plan. During 
this plan period, it was estimated that the peoples contribution in cash 
and kind amounted to K£ 8.5 million. The current plan estimates that the 
total value of self-help projects will Kill.5 million between 1974.and 19 78. 
Of this amount the Government expects to contribute K£815,00D (Third Development 
Plan, p. 4-82) The rest is expected to be contributed by the people, and 
any other volunteer agencies that would interested. fTo doubt, the major 
share of the total cost is expected to be Contributed by the people. Overall, 
it is now estimated that JIaramboe activities constitute about'30% of all 
capital formation in the rural areas. (Voice of Kenya January 1977) 
It is ironic that despite the obvious expansion of Har.ambeo 
activities, the movement is still surrounded with a great deal of mystery, 
and few people are able to say exactly what the movement represents. 
A listing of-all the ideas; associated with Harambee, confirms the 
view that: there-, is; :s.till-no con?census • as to. the social, political, economic 
and even theoretical meaning.of Harambee. A random listing, attributes the 
following meanings to Harairibee. 
. 1. . A continuation of an old; tradition under the umbrella of 
African socialism. v>.\:. .>. ;. .•'•. 
2. .A social movement for rural.development • 
3. A form of rural savings and. capitalisation 
A political slogan calling for a spirit of cooperation which 
has accidentally been, translated into projects, with a -
peculiar method of financing. ... .. ' ••:.'. 
5. A . Political .favour to the President - i" 
."• A means for politicians to ; ingratiate themselves with the 
President .< : . 
7. A meahs for politicians to ingratiate themselves with the ' 
Peasants 
8. A method of forced taxation . . ...... 
9. An irrational behaviour by the individual peasant contributors 
10. A community phenomenon which comprehends the contradictory.-
principles of voluntarism and coercion 
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11. A community reaction to "felt-needs" 
12. A political mechanism for rural participation 
13. An economic mechanism for utilising local resourced.' 
The list, though not exhaustive, is perhaps enough to show the 
bewildering array of meaning that have been attributed to Harambee. In an 
attempt to put some order to the above list, we shall first discuss the 
offcial view of Harambee and secondly we shall discuss the views and 
•research findings of academics who have analysed the phenomenon. 
The Official View 
Administrat ively, .Harambee activities come under the Department 
of Community Development, Ministry of Housing.and Social Services. The 
administrative arrangment gives us a clue as to the Governments view Harambee. 
The Department of Community Development is supposed work "essentially from 
the basic principle that sound, self-generating economic and social growth 
arises from participation of the people at all levels". The Community 
Development approach to social/economic development is supposed to be 
most effective "amongst the smallest collective groups." (Plan 1970-74, 
p. 523) Thus, we can see that the Government views Harambee first and 
foremost as a form of community development whose basic function is to 
create participatory mechanisms especially for the smallest collective 
groups. This, at least, is what can be.inferred from the Second Development 
Plan. 
Administrative and political participation-is however, only a 
means to a goal. The goal is social/economic development and it takes 
capital investment to effect it. In this respect, the'Government views 
Harambee as a means of promoting "domestic savings and investment". While 
the major burden of creating, the savings would fall on the people, the 
Government would be a co-partner by making small capital injections as a 
means of "maintaining the momentum" of projects. (Ibid) Although the 
capital injections by the Government would increase in time, and one 
assumes in proportion to the total Harambee inputs, the central idea would 
remain still remain "to encourage the enormous demostrated capacity of 
the people to develop .... through self-help". 
The Government also takes a social-psychological view to 
Hararnbee in addition to the political/economic views. Thus, as well as 
people getting tangible:social/economic benefits as a result of development 
through self-help, intangible benefits are also supposed to accrue to the 
people. These would include "social confidence" as the people participate 
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and become "more economically self-reliant". .It ds in this connection ; 
that immediately after independence i.e. during the First Development Plan, 
the emphasis Was placed' on the "stimulation of the self-help spirit". .Put 
differently, the :focus was on "motivation per se, as opposed to planning''. 
The foeuss had1 to be shifted to planning during the second Development Plan. 
The shift in focus was facilitated by a number of factors which 
have also been noticed by academicians (see next section) in their attempts 
to explain Harambee. First, "lack of community development or technical 
personnel to give advice at both the planning, and execution stages and a 
lack of area targets" meant that projects were allowed,drift. , Secondly, 
many self-help groups had acquired "a degree of autonomy so great" that 
they had forward on projects' "where it was doubtful that recurrent costs of 
operation could be ensured". Thirdly, "political and personal considerations 
.... sometimes influenced the initiation and location of projects often to 
the detriment of good overall planning"'. (Plan 70-^ 71+ p, 524). On the 
... - - vni; - \ re-surface , these factors appear to be explanatory. However, without a concept 
of what type .of development strategy Haramb.ee 'is meant to be or has become, 
. . . . .ii-it is difficult to assess the explanatory value of the "deviations" which 
have necessitated some re-thinking On the' part of the Government. 
.. .• • ' .. |. 'i i 
Some academicians have noticed the problem and consequently have 
tried to put forward what might be called "partial-explanations". They are 
"partial" because at this stage, they cannot be .construed as, propositions 
without an overall conception of Harambee. Rather, they seem to constitute 
a check-list of items to be expected by a student of Harambee. 
At the broadest level, the main question seems to be: why the 
"facts" of concern isolated by the Government might fall into place. As 
........ • I- ---••• .i" • 
it is, the Government assumes that the factors are of equal importance. 
Furthermore, no attempt is made to try and explain the factors, in the 
context of social/political and economic development in Kenya. The 
Government further assumes that "the people" are a homogeneous category 
that is able and willing to participate. Perhaps the people, are willing, 
but certainly they are not a homogeneous category. Their ability to parti-
cipate cannot be taken for granted and neither can the benefits. It -is,. . 
these and other questions that academicians have addressed, themselves to 
in an attempt to exaplain Harambee as a social, political and economic 
phenomenon. 
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The Academics' Interpretations 
Ohe should re-emphasise at the outset that so far, no coverall 
'explanation of Harambee has emerged. Rather, what we have are a number 
of themes - what we have' called a check-list - usually found in studies 
iof Harambee. The themes, as we have pointed out constitute only partial 
explanations. They are explanations because they go further than the 
the Government in the conscious attempt to answer the question: why 
Harambee?. They are partial because, so far no one has attempted an overall 
conceptual integration of the themes. 
1. The Social Tradition Theme 
This theme is common in what might be called the community 
development approach to the study of Harambee and it can be summarised as 
follows. Harambee is among others, a form, of traditionally sanctioned 
informal cooperation i.e. a traditional mode of operation is being utilised 
to cor &ct the orthodox community development approach whose major- fault 
has been .its failure to combine planning and implementation at local 
levels leading to a situation whereby rural changes have been imposed on 
the peasants. Accordingly, Harambee is an ingeneous participatory mechanism 
because it utilises traditional structures of cooperation like a clan, 
thereby alleviating the heecl for new participatory institutions and at 
the same time correcting the faults of textbook approaches to community 
development. (Askwith 1960 :Holmquist 1970; and especially Mbithi 1372)-. 
As can be seen, this theme comes very close to the official viev; 
although it might be unfair to criticise it without having expounded it 
in full, a few questions might be riased. First , it might be accurate to 
say that Harambee is a form of traditionally sanctioned cooperation, but ,. 
it would be premature to conclude, like some politicians in Kenya have done, 
that Harambee and traditional self-heln are the same phenomenon. This is. 
an issue that-can only be settled after an examination of traditional 
self-help in Kenya or a particular part of Kenya, something that so far 
has not been done in any detailed form. The same argument applies to the "'I : 
claim that Harambee has managed to correct some faults associated with fhe' 
community development approach. The extent to which Harambee, facilities 
local planning and implementation is still largely unassessed, something, 
which will become evident later on. .,-. fv 
However, despite the fact that the two issues can only be settled 
empirically, one can argue that although traditional structures might have 
been incorporated into the Harambee movement, we cannot equate it with 
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traditional communal .self-help for at least two reasons and possibly more. 
First, ..except in the- colonial period - and' even this applied only to an 
aspect of self-help at that time viz. The government supervised community 
development activities in Central Nynnza, North Nyanza, Machakos, Kitui 
and Kiambu - the State was not i.pyolved,. Secondly, .traditionally ,eohtri 
butions were made mainly in the form of collective labour, but tho gains 
were individual. Thus there.was little chance of an individual contribution 
and not getting any personal benefits, something which is likely to happen 
today. Thirdly, the community development apporach, whether orthodox or 
modified, can itself be, and has been questioned especially because of its 
exclusion of politics (Kramrner.) and a general tendency to assume away 
intra-community conflicts, whatever their causes may be. 
2. The Development Theme 
This theme has a number of sub-themes. At the broadest level, 
it has been argued — 
that the one criterion that distinguishes Harambee from self-help 
activities in other countries, .is its rural nature, i.e. Harambee is first 
and foremost a rural, development strategy, (^olnick 1974) A modified form 
of the argument is that'Harambee is not an alternative to rural development 
in Kenya, nut part of the whole strategy of rural development in the 
country. (Mbithi. 1972)- But what type of rural strategy is Harambee and 
o;n what, social group, should it be predicated? The second question will be 
discussed in the next section. 
One answer to the first question is that Harambee is a non-
developmental type of strategy for a number of reasons. First ,through 
its own dynamics, or through some phenomenon that has as yet not been 
discovered, the strategy encourages financing of consumer projects such 
as Schools, community halls, health centres, etc as opposed to farm 
oriented productive projects whose surplus can then be ploughed back into 
the farm, thus in increasing productivity. (Mbithi 1972) Second, Harambee 
increases 'rural1 differentiation because money is raised from everybody, 
including the very poor, to finance projects which are inaccessible to 
the poor. This is particularly true of schools and institutes of technology 
which charge fees above the ability of the poor. Thus, the contributors 
are not necessarily the beneficiaries, and this leads to increased 
inequalities among, the peasants • (Mut.iso & Godfrey 1973;' Anderson 1971) 
Third, depending on the nature and the site of the projects, Harambee can 
lead to a.situation where :the country becomes increasingly indebted to 
outsiders, both in terms of providing the initial capital and in terms of 
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providing the staff and the.running expenses. Again, this is particularly 
true of the Institute of science .and technology. j.(.Mutiso 8 Godfrey 1973; 
Godfrey 19 73).. 
Another answer to the question raised above is that Harambee is 
developmental; but it takes the form of pre-emptive development. Pre-
emption has several characteristics'. First it is characterised by the 
tendency to choose a project'unlikely to be initiated by the Government, 
but likely, to be taken over. O'utiso & Godfrey 1973) Second, groups try 
to pre-empt the field of contestants by convincing the Government that it 
is politically and economically unwise to deny support to a superior 
- i '1 
local effort, and in the process any central plan that may exist is 
ignored or what amounts to the same imposition, self-help groups purposely 
go beyond the plan because they probably would not receive aid without 
pre-emptive local effort. (Holmquist 1970) Third, there is a tendency to 
initiate projects before defining the goals and strategies, thus sharply 
contrasting community needs with the priorities defined by policy-makers. 
(Mbithi 1972) The political implications of the pre-emptive strategy 
will be discussed in the next section when we try to answer the second 
question raised above viz. on what social group should Harambee be predicated? 
The issue of whether Harambee is basically rural in nature can be 
settled easily if one uses the criterion of the geopraphical location of 
the projects. However, it becomes a little more complicated if one uses other 
criteria. First, if one uses the criterion of provision of service, then 
one might discover that the larger the project, (e.g. an Institute of 
Science and. Technology) the more likelihood that it will provide service 
for people from the urban areas as well. Fortunately, the very large projects 
are few, and the medium ones such as schools and health centres are forced 
to serve rural communities. First by their geographical location and 
the 
secondly by the tendency Qf /urban people to perceive the services, provided 
through Harambee as being inferior to the urban services. Secondly, if one 
uses the criterion of orgin of inputs that go into constructing the projects, 
then it is not so obvious that the majority of the projects are rural in 
nature. For both small and large projects, there has always been a 
substantial amount of inputs originating from the urban areas, though the 
labour' is usually provided by the local peasants. 
... As to whether-the distinguishing criterion of Harambee is its rural 
nature or not one would argue.that this -dannot simply be asserted. It wouid 
require one to first establish that Harambee is actually rural in nature 
and secondly that .self-help, activities--in other countries' have ' a much bigger 
urban content. Thus, one would have to at least make a survey of self-help 
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activities in other countries. The study of Eastern Nigeria by David and 
Audreny Smock (1972) and of Acholi District, 'Opahda by Colin Leys (1967) 
suggest that rural-orientation of self-help activities in Africa, is a 
widespread phenomenon. 
The question of whether Harambee is developmental or not depends 
first on the' available evidence. Tf the evidence shows that most of the 
projects benefit a • ;cctioii! of the Peasants, with the effect of increasing 
inequalities, then one would have to reassess the developmental claims made 
.for Harambee. So far the evidence available from analysis of large and 
medium projects suggests that these projects contribute to rural differenti-
ation. ' ' 
With reference to the distinction, made by Mbithi (see above.) . 
between farm-oriented projects and consumer oriented projects (with the 
latterrbeing non-deyelonmental) one can argue that there is no dominant, 
reason why rural development should be.conceived solely in .terms of directly 
productive projects. Increased farm productivity might be desirable. 
However the problem of rural poverty is also social and political in 
addition to being economic, "here is r-ven some evidence (Smocks; Ibid) 
suggesting that to the peasantry, development means provision of social 
amenities rather than amenities which will lead to immediate increased 
productivity. Mbithi's distinction would be relevant, 'however if it were 
possible to show that consumer projects, by their very nature lead to to 
the exploitation of some groups by other 9 something which was nearly impos-
sible. in traditional farm - and invidual oriented self-help'. 
The question of external Indebtedness, which is raised by some 
students of Harambee, should be taken seriously. How-ver, as pointed above, 
this is only applicable to very large projects and these are few in the 
country. 
Finally, whether and why harambee is a form of pre-emptive strategy 
is basically a political 
issue that calls for an examination of the nature 
of planning and resource distribution in the country, with a view to finding 
out why the peasants would resort to this type of strategy. One. would 
however, have to ascertain that the strategy should be predicated on "the 
peasantry as a whole, or even a stratum of the peasantry, as opposed to the 
urban bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie. 
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3. The Political Theme 
Like.the-development theme, the"political theme has several 
strands which can be looked at separately. First, we shall deal with the 
issue raised above, viz. whose development strategy is' Harambee. 
, ,. . One .answer which is readily derivable from those who have 
analysed Harambee. from the point of view of community development is that 
Harambee is basically a peasant strategy for rural development. Thus, the 
peasants, by-,.deciding to do something about their "felt needs" (Oyugi 1974) 
are in fact making a political statement. They are in effect expressing 
; dissatisfaction with .the ways developmental resources are being allocated 
at the centre, and thereby questioning the wisdom and the priorities of 
the central planning mechanisms. ('lb it hi and Rasmus son 1974; Colebatch 
1973) Seen from this point of view, Harambee assumes aspects of social 
protects5 though some people would argue that protest, more often than not 
manifests itself through withdrawal, than through active participation-, 
thereby legit imising the very institutions that the protest is aimed, 
against. (Migot-Adholla, 1977) 
A variation of the argument above is -that Harambee is basically 
a peasant strategy, but the-peasantry is clever enough to know that there 
is no reason, why "nerceiveO, need will correlate with action". (Hoimquist 
1972) Thus, in order to correlate perceived needs with action, the 
co-opt both local and national elites as the main:sponsors in exchange for 
political support. (Myitiso & Godfrey 1973; Anderson 197 3; Holnquist 1972 
S . - ; • 
Still at the community level, ii: has been argued that politically 
Harambee represents a symbolic mechanism for identifying with national 
development. (Mbithi, 197?) In this sense, Harambee is a" "responsive"'" 
kind of behaviour as opposed to "initiative" behaviour. Whether this can 
be translated into power relations is not clear. politically, symbols 
perform an integrative function and are. nearly always created by the 
ruling elites to serve their interests. Mbithi is not clear on this' point-
as he does not examine the direction of the symbol. However, if we - accept 
the interpretation that Harambee is a result of manipulation of symbols, 
from the top, then this is consistent with the nature of political symbolism 
Perhaps the most popular political interpretation of Hararribee 
is that it is an arena for elite competition, both at the local and the 
National levels. From the community perspective, it is argued that one 
characteristic of the Kenyan political system at the national level is 
that it has gradually become depoliticised, thereby increasingly relying 
on the legitimating role of the President. The result is that ''Political 
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process devolved from national centre to the periphery and Harambee 
activity has become in important arena,within1 which political 'leadership 
at; the local level is determined. (Go'le^atch1 1973; Mutiso k Godfrey 1973 
P. 1) Thas; Harambee has become a vehicle for personal ambitions . 
(Holmquist 1973) 
An extension of the some argument is that the elites are not 
simply:manipulating 'the peasants. The peasants are aware of what is taking 
place and they in turn make'use of Harambee as a means of forcing account-
ability on politicians.. Furthermore it is' not simply aspiring political 
leaders competing with each, other. There are the additional elements of 
local -elites competing with .national elites (Oyugi 1974-) and' the Political 
elites- competing with administrative' elites. (Nyangira 1970; Wall is 1973) 
All the affected elites in this situation are aiming at legitimising their 
roles- if.not personal positions and this is how- competition develops. 
The elite competition' can easily develop into conflict and attempts 
to control each other. -Thus.lithe administrative elites, citing the need 
to stay "within the..plan" or "security reasons" ' would, for exmaple, refuse 
the political elites the licenses to hold Harambee meetings, and the 
politicians would react by:sending extra-large donations through local 
clients who do not•need licenses to hold meetings. Thus, despite local 
initiative, the fate of a project can end up by being resolved at the 
centre (Colebatch 1973) especially when a- project needs a sponsor like an 
M..P. who has. access to. national resources-. In this case the competition 
and control are by proxy. As can be seen, t>:j' extended argument is really 
that it does not matter "whose" strategy Harambee is." Different strata in 
the political system make use.of it depending on their immediate and 
particular interests. . . - • • ' • 
The various political interpretations outlined above are .a little 
confusing because it is not clear what the main argument is. If for example, 
we accept that Harambee is a peasant strategy, how then do the elites 
feature so prominently? One go even further and pose the question: what 
does it mean to say that Harambee is a peasant strategy? Does it mean that 
the peasants are always the main beneficiaries in social-economic terms, 
or does it mean that regardless of who the. eventual beneficiaries are, 
the peasants take the initiative both in planning and. in implementation, 
and then coopt the elites as some writers?, argue? These are'basically 
empirical questions that can only be asswered after analysing/ actual projects 
One .can argue however, that the answer as to whether Harambee is 
a peasant or an elite, s.tartegy is .not eitther oiH 'It would depend 'on many 
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factors which would include the nature and degree of political competition 
and also the size of a'particular project. The ore severe the political 
competition and the bigger the:- project, the more likelihood that both local 
and national: elites, will try to control the project and make it appear as 
their own. The only problem here is that one would have to decide on a 
criteria for "bigness". One such criteria could be the ratio of capital 
to labour inputs. The higher the ratio, the more important the role of 
elites, both in initiation and implementation. 
But-:even if one'were able to show that contrary to popular opinions 
the Harambee is realy a grass-roots phenomenon, the question still remains; 
why is. it that even elites who do not appear to have anything to gain -
politically or -otherwise - from a particular project appear to be willing to 
send large donations and have their donations publicly anounced. in an area 
hundreds of miles from their own home area? This shifts the discussion 
from the local level to the national level. i -
In respect to the question raised above one would have to disagree 
with the argument (Mutiso & Godfrey, 1973) that leadership battles in Kenya 
are fought at the local level which would partly explain the donations from 
outs'ide the community. In its place one could substitute the argument that 
the issue is not simply a question of personal power and leadership. 
Rather, '?e have to look -at the ideological character of Harambee. At the 
national level, it can be argued that Harambee serves the ideological purpose 
of mystifying the inequalities between the various societal strata by making 
it•appear legitmate to accumulate so long as one is doing ones duty by 
"participating" in development through contributions outside ones home area 
In other words,- the idea of Harambee serves the political interests of a 
particular stratum in the political system, and it should be possible to 
identify the particular stratum and the, interests that Harambee serves. 
Thus, although on the surface, and at the national level, Harambee appears 
to be predicated on the wealthy individual, it can serve the collective 
interests of the wealthy political stratum. 
4. The Theoretical Theme 
• There is very little deliberate theorising on Harambee, and the 
little there is centres on the question; whv do the peasants contribute to 
Harambee projects? Is it really due to felt needs? More specifically, are 
individuals being rational when they contribute? As would be expected, 
field researchers have attempted to answer the first version of the question 
since it is amenable to empirical analysis. The second version has largely 
been left unanswered, one suspects because of its philosophical overtones. 
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One of the most popular arguments is that Harambee contributions 
are not entirely voluntary, though it is impossible to estimate the extent 
of coercion. For example, in Central Province, during the construction of 
Kiambu Institute of Science arid Technology,:receiots of contributions to 
the Institute had'to be produced before transaction of any official 
business like paying school fees, ourchase of a licence etc. At the Coast 
workers and teachers unions agreed to a 25? deduction from the members 
salaries (Mutiso and Godfrey 1973) Even for very small projects, it has * i j • . . . 
been noticed that Chiefs tend to be authoritarian in their demand for 
contributions. (Walis 1973, Colebatch 1973- Nvangira 1970) 
A second argument is that though there might be elements of 
coercion, Harambee contributions are by and large voluntary. They are 
voluntary because their analysis cannot he based on individuals. In other 
words, they are a group phenomenon. For example, citing evidence from the 
organization of groups movements (Bittner 1963) Mbithi (1973) argues that 
group movements like Harambee have dynamics of their own which manifests 
itself through hostility to individualism. Thus individual! have to conform 
as a result of articulated and sometimes unarticulated group pressure. 
A somewhat similar argument is that though people contribute as 
a result of what appears to be group pressure, the pressure is really 
instigated by bearers of "new ideas" like, national leaders and local 
leaders. (Bolnick 1974) Thus the contributions are neither a result of 
community "felt-needs", nor of pressure by the entire community, since .the 
latter is never a homogeneous entity. 
Whether one accepts the second argument and its variation as 
being sufficient, or not, it seems that there'is a need-to be-clear first 
on the dynamics of Harambee contributions and secondly (and perhaps more 
important) on the nature and meaning of coercion. Is coercion simply 
pressure from someone who is in a position to evolve the powers of his 
official position or does one include pressure from opinion leaders and 
prominent personalities? I would argue that the definition of "pressure" 
should be broadened to include opinion leaders and prominent personalities 
This is because, in my experience, this category of people is seen by the 
peasants as being "semi-official" because of its ready access to the 
officials proper. 
Whatever definition of coercion one chooses to accept, theoretically 
one has to allow some kind of pressure, be it from officials, non-officials 
or even some segment of the community. However, the theoretical acceptance 
of some kind of pressure is only applicable to some types of projects. 
- .3 - IDS/WP 302 
viz. those projects that fall under the category of collective consumption 
goods . 
According to the free-rider "theory," rational individuals will 
not voluntarily support a collective consumption service when exclusion' 
from use of the good as a.penalty for failure to contribute to the cost 
of the project is technically impossible (as with national defence) or •• 
impracticable (as with a road). In this circumstance (non-excludability) 
one's benefit .is largely independent of ones contribution. Thus .each 
individual has a choice of donating or not. donating, with approximately 
the same benefits. In either case, "rationality" dictates that-one. not 
contribute. (Bolnick 19 72 and 1974) 
It is in recognition of the free rider problem that some students 
of Harambee have argued that peasants make contributions as a result of 
a number of factors which include inter alia, social influence, and the: 
fact that the peasant community might be so small that ones contribution 
is significant relative to the whole and would therefore be noticed and 
missed. This argument however is limited to the community and sociological 
levels. Furthermore, as we have pointed out it applies when 
the rationality of contributions for collective consumption goods is 
under question. If we now take contributions for all types of "goods", 
shift the level of analysis from the community to the national level, 
and re^inpret the contributions then the question becomes: Is it probable 
that the idea of Harambee has, politically, like ujamaism, acquired 
ideological weight, that is, something that one must not be seen or 
appear to be against, and if so why? 
C: Summary: Political Implications 
The political origins of Harambee as we know it today are clear 
enough not to merit an extended discussion. In 1963, when the call fox1 
Harambee was made, it was not obvious that Kenya would continue holding, 
together after independence. In addition to centrifugal ethnic forces, 
there was the problem of the Majimbo constitution which the country had 
just inherited from Britain. Rightly or wrongly, the President, as the 
spokesman of both the Government and the ruling party KANU, felt that 
the regional constitution was not compatible with national unity. Hence, 
the political slogan of Harambee. 
Up' to now, it is not clear whether the call for Harambee was 
meant to be translated into development projects, or whether it was meant 
to operate solely at the level of an integrating slogan. This, however, 
is a different issue altogether. For the Present purposes, the main issue 
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is that Harambee projects originated with active Government encouragement : . : • • i 
and this' is what calls for an explanation. We have already seen that,.the 
need to motivate the people to help themselves so !that they may acquire con-
fidence in the process. This explanation is, however, not sufficient. 
A more satisfactory explanation would have to take into account 
a number of factors which must include, inter alia, a very weak planning 
machinery, lack of any participatory institutions for example a well 
organised political' party, lack of a grass-roots developmental ideology 
and the high public expectations at that time. Politically, th^ last., 
point is perhaps the most .important. It can be argued that under conditions 
of general scarcity and high public expectations - conditions which 
prevailed in 1963 - an institution like Hararnbee serves the political 
Purpose of encouraging demands at the communal level, thereby shifting 
the locus of demands from the National level v/here they might be more 
concerted and therefore destablishing. Furthermore, and perhaps, a bit 
cynically, when the policy of self-help becomes generally allerted, the 
people can always be referred to themselves, whenever they make any demands. 
- 'S ' •>• ' I---"-'-
In this sense, an institution like Harambee serves the purpose of 
political control. (Biennen 1974) 
While an extended argument along the lines sketched above might 
explain politically the orgins and the immediate evolution of, Harambee, 
it does not explain the subsequent enthusiasm that surprised even the 
Government, and neither does it explain the present day operation,, an 
issue that has bothered academics as we have seen. 
The Government explains the subsequent enthusiasm in terms of 
'•'personal political considerations", (other planning problems being 
(1) lack of technical, personnel and (2) relative autonomy of self-help 
groups. These two problems do not address thems 
elves to the issue of 
expansion) which could be re-interpreted as an.individualised way of 
saying that the political strategy outlined above has been effective, 
This, of course, does not mean that Harambee was imposed on . the , people, 
by ambitious leaders as a means of controlling the peasants. -It did not 
need to. Political control could have been exchanged for tangible social,/ 
economic projects, and this leads us to the dominant concept in the 
political interpretations of Haramb.ee viz.. the patron-client mode of 
exchange. •'•'•' : 
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Clientelism has been applied to Hararrib.ee sometimes without 
pausing to draw out its full implications..1 It is a handy ..Concept to 
apply to Harambee especially because it seems to explain some of the 
bothered oroblems which have_/^  researchers yjho have analysed; the Harambee 
phenomenon. For example, it might explain the role of traditional and 
... . •' . it 
ethnic structures in facilitating self-help. 
However, if we should accept that Harambee operates on a patron-
client basis, then we must also entertain the possibility that we are 
looking at a mode of exchange which is unequal by its very nature. An 
assumption that is often unquestioned in applying the concept of 
clientelism to Harambee is that the patron-client relation operates- on a 
basis of reciprocity. Reciprocity, however.does not mean -equalityi It 
has been argued, for example, that an "imbalance in reciprocity" is inherent 
in patron-client relations. The patron is in a position to supply 
unilaterally goods and services which the client-needs for survival and-
well-being. (Blau 1964) Furthermore, like an. insurance- company, the 
patron can afford to get rid of one or even, a few clients without too 
much loss. The client is not in such a position;. 
Even without resulting to a detailed theoretical analysis, it is 
evident that clientelism is based on asymmetrical linkages between 
.individuals of unequal wealth, and power (Maqu.et, l^ Sft) The assymetry is 
crucial as any significant shift of resources moves the relationship 
toward greater equality of status and the transformation of clientelism 
into bargaining relationships among equals. Clientelism is thus a 
relation of domination perpetuating the inequalities between patrons and 
clients. Furthermore, it is conservative and and status-quo oriented. 
This serves the interests of the patron elites. However, to maintain loyalty 
of clients, some resources and benefits must be distributed, (Lemarch and 
Legg, 1972; also Scott 1972) 
One of the conclusions arriyed at from theoretical analyses-
similar to the ones just outlined is that clientelism is a form of 
exchange which is characteristic of situations of underdevelopment. 
(Cotler, 1972) In terms of stratification, clientelism creates a form of-
vertical stratification, either along ethnic lines or along regional lines 
This, it can be argued, serves an ideological/political purpose through its 
1. The methodological problems inherent in the concept of clientelism 
are discussed by Robert R. Kaufman: "The Patron-Client concept and 
macropolitics: Prospects and problems" Comperative studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 16(3) June 1974. 
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• • C . . .' - (d i! 
blurring of any class divisions that.might be developing. In a situation 
where national bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie are .developing, it 
would be expected that the vertical stratification would not cut all the 
way up all of the time. Most of the time, the vertical stratification 
would keep the workers and the peasants mystified as to their class 
interests;: The bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie too could be 
mystified except when'it comes to an issue that borders on their survival 
as an economic group, (de Kadt, 1970 and Salvati, 1972) 
. • '-.J +;. ,?r. •> *r!t ••..• > > ' . : riit/p:- • !..:>*•' 
The mystifying, weight of clientelism is such that even reputable 
social scientists have been tempted to always juxtapose, it with any other 
• • 
form of stratification and particularly stratification along class lines 
(Graziano 19 73) Sometimes the argument is quite,explicit,to the.effect 
that clientelism is incompatible with class formation.' (Johnson, 1973) 
Still, others, have argued that a patron-client relationship is developmental 
at le&st in the political sense as it offers a stable reciprocal relationship 
(Powell 1970) Furthermore, it "is" integrative politically, socially and 
economically since the middle men serve the integrative function. 
(Weingrod: 19R3: Smith 1960) ' 'J"' 
The point here is that depending on ones views.about development, 
clientelism can be viewed either as developmental or.non-developmental. 
Thus, if ones conception .of development is premised on stable .exchange 
relations, regardless of the inherent inequalities and the political 
functions of such an exchange, then the cppclusion that .clientelism is 
developmental is at least consistent. 
The few. comments above are perhaps enought to show that it is 
not enough to simply mention that. Harambee is based on a patron-dent 
relations,. without attempting to- draw out' the implications of such 
relations, and the complexities of the very concept of clientelism. !\t 
the very least, one must be. clear on what is being'exchanged for what, 
the political implications of the exchange, and the equity implications 
of a system based on a series of patron-client exchanges. 
"While the discussion so far cannot claim to have exhaused all 
. . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
the problematic aspects of Harambee it, at least, raises research issues 
that 'would hopefully be of interest to students of Harambee. Below are 
research issues that are of interest to the author. Some of the issues 
1.' ' ; ' See" Peter Flynn "Glass, Clientelism and Coercion" Comparative 
politics XII (2) July 1974. where he draws out the' political amplications 
of class and clientelists modes of stratification. . < . . . 
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can be approached empirically, while others-will have to be approached ';.,.: i , . . . y I . p. • 5.1 ' 
"theoretically. • Hopefully this would lead to a more politically oriented 
conception'of Harambe'e. 
D: "Research1''Tissues 
1. To what extent and in what respects is .Harambee a unique rural 
development phenomenon? Is -it accurate to claim ,that its 
distinguishing characteristic is its rural orientation? This <>f 
would require putting Harambee in the context of self-help as a 
much wider phenomenon. The' emphasis would be on the political 
aspects of self-help and case studies Would be drawn from Africa 
as far is this is possible. This would also afford the opportunity 
to evaluate the community development approach to rural development 
in light of experiences from other countries. 
2. While it is expected that a comparative approach would yield some 
useful information, it is also expected that this.information 
would have to be supplemented with some historical information. 
What then are historical and traditional roots of Harambee? • i 
The term "Harambee" has onlv been applied to self-help activities 
in the post-independence period. However, the authors summarised 
1 above are right in arguing "that to a certain extent, Harambee has 
•what might be called traditional legitimisation, especially in 
the rural areas. Put what is the extent of this legitimisation? 
One cannot assume that the phenomenon has remained the same, 
in terms of for example, who participated, the nature of contri-
butions, the nature- of the output and work performed, the nature 
of reciprocity, the effect of new factors emerging during the 
colonial era and the underlying and shifting' ideologies. For 
example, it is evident that there was a shift in organisational 
, ,structures and ideological intentions during the colonial era. 
Before the-colonical period, the organisational base of rural 
self-help among; the K.ikuyu for instance was the clan, and the 
principals of reciprocity and voluntarism were closely adhered to. 
During the colonial period, th-: organisational base was expanded 
to include most of Kikuyuland and for the first time, the emphasis 
was on social gains, and the movement acquired, an ideological, 
meaning. This was during the thirties and the forties when Kenyatta 
and Mbiyu Koinange (the'present Minister of State, in. the President's 
Office) started organising Karinga Schools GKikuyu Independent 
Schools) as a general protest against missionary education. 
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(Koinange 1955) Thus the movement had a political purpose, and an 
ideological purpose viz. creating solidarity'. Mbichi (op cit) argues 
that present Harambee also.serves the purpose, of creating solidarity, 
at the grassroots level. The circumstances are, however, -different 
and one cannot assume continuity.. However,.the assumption of continuity 
could serve political and ideological, purposes> It. would be. to the 
interests of the patron-elides.to assume the continuity, for then it 
would serve an integrative.function, and consequently their interests. 
3. Answers to the first two questions would, hopefully supply useful 
contextual information for answering pur. main question viz;, to what 
extent is present day Harambee .mechanism for grassroots participation 
and to what is it. performing a .political function .for the elites who act 
as patrons? Even if we were,.to discover that Harambee.has such traditional 
legitimisation that we can partly, explain the willingness to participate 
at the grassroots level,, there is. one aspect of Harambee which is 
different from traditional s.elf-heln activities.., THis- is- its national 
character. More specifically, the involvement of'the•elites either 
acting on their own behalf, or through individuals acting as members of 
the bureaucracy makes the present phenomenon different from its tradi-
tional predecessors. The nature of the interaction between the elites 
and the peasants Would to a large extent determine the participatory or 
the non-participatory nature of Harambee. This is the central issue in 
the politics of Harambee. At the national level, it is self-evident 
that the best way for politicians, high-ranking civil servants, and 
even businessmen to gain r/A'ticnal exposure it to attend a Harambee 
meeting and make large donations. However, it is not certain that their 
is a similar degree of involvement with smaller local projects that do 
not offer the same possibility of exposure. The exception to this would 
perhaps be the local member of parliament, who' is likely to be involved 
in the small projects in his own constituteoncy,/3-! means of maintaining 
political support. Concentrating on state agents, while not entirely 
ignoring elites acting in other capacities we would try, to get 
information, about their interaction With the peasants on: 
1. Initiation of projects '< • • • 
t,. . , , • i . 
, 2.; Planning of projects-
3. Implementation (actual Work done) 
4. Contributions (especially decisions Bri 'nature and amount) 
5. Any linkages the peasants might have with outside groups. 
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The information sought should be able to get partly through a 
questionnaire^ at the grassroots 'level and partly through analysis of 
documents and public' statements. The information would be "utilised 
in trying to assess the extent of local" involvement in Harambee 
„ . . . projects, the degree of elites involvement and their occupational 
characteristics. This-exercise would be restricted to one district, 
through secondary materials from other districts will be used. In 
,the analysis of the data, special attention will be paid to the 
.... degree, of involvement by the bureaucratic and political elites. 
4. What are the developmental characteristics of Harambee and to what 
4. ~ . . 
extent are these dependent on the political characteristics? Some 
, of the developmental information will be sought through the questionnaire, 
especially information on type of project, benefits of projects, costs 
of projects etc. However, sine-.' this information would be restricted 
to one district, it would obviously have to be heavily supplemented 
with what is already known about Harambee in the rest bf the country. 
Depending on the political characteristics, it should be possible to 
....draw out the developmental implications and compare these with actual view 
, developmental characteristics -with' a _/ to assessing the'determinative 
.:. or non-determinative, role of the political characteristics. 
5. What type of rural development strategy is Harambee? The answer 
to this question would, of course, depend on the type of answers we 
get for the other questions. He hope that no matter what answers we 
get, they would facilitate a conceptualisation of Harambee in . 
political - economic terms. It is expected that the emphasis would 
be on the equity implications of the political economy of Harambee. 
C. Conclusion 
No doubt Harambee movement is a complex phenomenon and it is 
not always easy to isolate the political, administrative, and -:conortiiC 
elements. It is even more difficult to. synthesise the, elements into a 
concept for rural development once, they have been isolated. This problem, 
notwithstanding one hopes that by employing comparative, historical, empirical 
and theoretical approaches, one would meet with some measure.of success. 
It is to be appreciated that emphasis on any one of the: constituent elements 
of Harambee would be out of choice,-rather than any overiding theoretical, 
empirical or even logical reasons. •'-.•"'' 
A modified version of a questionnaire used by Prof. Mbithi. T-'ith kind p 
permission of Professor Mbithi, Department of Sociology, Nairobi. 
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